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Abstract: We investigate the distribution of risk preferences and the
frequency of expected utility violations along the gradient of market devel-
opment. To do this, we collect experimental and survey data from a random
sample of the population at four sites in Peru that differ in their level of
competition and development. Similar to previous studies, we find that vio-
lations of expected utility theory are frequent. More importantly, however,
violations are far less frequent the more competitive the market is. Also, our
study suggests that experience in trade is not always associated with fewer
behavioral anomalies. For instance, wholesale traders in an oligopolistic mar-
ket with many years of experience are more likely to violate expected utility
theory than entrepreneurs in an adjacent market with less experience. As
hypothesized by Alchian (1950), it is in highly competitive markets where
the evidence of rational behavior is found.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long argued that market pressure, evolution or learning
should eventually make people behave rationally. Alchian (1950) argued that
not only would markets discipline behavior but that this would make it im-
possible to distinguish whether the success of a firm was due to shrewdness
or luck. Later, Becker (1962) showed that aggregate behavior could sat-
isfy basic properties of price theory even if individual behavior was random.
Nowhere is it more clear that rational behavior can emerge endogenously
than in evolutionary game theory (Weibull, 1995; Samuelson, 1997), which
provides several examples of how evolutionary pressure can produce ratio-
nal play in games. Similar examples of convergence to rational play can be
found in the literature on learning (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Erev and
Roth, 1998). That one might eventually reach seemingly rational behavior is
important because it implies that regardless of one’s initial limitations (cog-
nitive or otherwise), basic economic intuition applies. But if Alchian (1950)
was right and market forces shape behavior, we should also be cautious about
the generality of policy recommendations. This paper presents experimen-
tal evidence showing that the competitiveness of the environment is indeed
negatively correlated with the presence of behavioral biases.
To test how rational behavior is distributed across populations, we collect
experimental data on random samples of four populations in Peru. The
experiments were accompanied with rich survey data, allowing us to control
for a series of potentially confounding effects. The experiments are based
on a simple experiment first proposed by Chew and Waller (1986) and are
designed to parsimoniously detect several violations of expected utility. The
design is such that expected utility would predict a clear pattern of behavior.
The choices made in the experiments, therefore, inform us of the kind of
preferences producing violations. The key innovation of our design is that
the experiments were conducted on dynamic, but not equally developed,
economic areas.
Contrary to common procedures in experimental economics, the partic-
ipant population was randomly selected. The sample includes two contigu-
ous economic markets in Lima-Peru, a highly competitive one composed of
small garment entrepreneurs and a highly concentrated wholesale market.
The third site is a dynamic peasant community in the Peruvian Andes, and
the fourth is employees who currently work in the private sector. All the
employees used to work in the public sector before it was privatized. Given
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the nature of the Peruvian economy and labor markets, the samples from the
garment entrepreneurs and employees in the private sector represent compet-
itive areas of the economy. The wholesale market and the peasant community
represent more stable environments. Within each environment (competitive
or stable), the groups differ in their level of development or endowments of
human capital. The variation across these four sites therefore allows us to
separate whether differences in behavior are simply a reflection of differences
in socio-economic characteristics and initial endowments.
We confirm that a significant proportion of subjects violate the inde-
pendence axiom as first shown by Allais (1953). This result persists under
different specifications of errors in decision making (see Loomes et al. (2002)
for a discussion of alternative methods). This is important because it shows
that experimental methods can be utilized across diverse populations and
produce robust results. Our nonparametric estimates show that violations of
economic rationality correlate with age, education and risk aversion. Educa-
tion diminishes the presence of violations, as does being young and risk neu-
tral. However, these variables only explain a small portion of the violations.
That behavioral biases are stronger among less educated and less developed
areas gives support to the idea that the “poor but rational” paradigm of de-
velopment is not necessarily appropriate (Duflo, 2003; Mullainathan, 2007).1
The discussion on what market or evolutionary pressures imply for the dis-
tribution of preferences has remained mainly theoretical (see Robson (2001)
for a survey).2 Our work establishes that preferences and the economic envi-
1Some authors have suggested that risk averse (or impatient) behavior in low-stakes
gambles, as the ones presented here, should be evidence of the failure of economic rational-
ity and that behavior different from risk neutrality in experiments with small stakes would
imply impossibly high levels of risk aversion (Rubinstein, 2006; Rabin, 2000; Benjamin,
Brown, and Shapiro, 2006). Our experiments show that risk preferences over small stakes
lotteries neither imply nor preclude violations of the independence axiom. This result is
consistent with Cox and Sadiraj (2006)’s argument that risk preferences over small stakes
is not a necessary nor sufficient condition for non-standard decision making under risk.
2There are as many examples showing that evolution will select rationality (and some-
times selfishness) as well as the opposite. Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and Eshel, Samuel-
son, and Shaked (1998) show that altruistic behavior can survive in an environment with
local interactions. Robson (1996) shows that evolution does not necessarily produce ra-
tional behavior in non-stationary risky environments. Samuelson (2004) shows a model
where nature finds it optimal to endow individuals with consumption comparison effects
and Rayo and Becker (2007) and Netzer (2008) show that nature might find it necessary to
endow humans with reference dependent preferences. Both these papers show that innate
cognitive constraints might make some behavioral biases necessary. There are no models
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ronment are not orthogonal. This suggests that economic policy itself might
have unintended consequences on preferences and that not all policies and
institutions might work equally well across environments.
Other authors have investigated whether markets or experience can re-
duce behavioral biases (Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Knez, Smith, and
Williams, 1985; Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze, 1987). Using artefactual field
experiments, List (2003, 2004) shows that experienced sport card traders are
less likely to suffer from the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler, 1991).3 Closest to our paper, List and Haigh (2005) show that stock
market traders are less likely to conform to Allais’ paradox than college stu-
dents.4 Our experimental design is different in that we include five lottery
questions to check the robustness of the violations and to distinguish among
competing alternative theories to expected utility. Also, in an attempt to
increase the external validity of our results, our experimental design relies on
random samples of the population of interest. More importantly, by vary-
ing market competition and levels of development our results show that it
is not market experience per se, but the nature of the market itself, that is
correlated with the preferences of participants.5
This would suggest that caution is in order when making general state-
ments about what model of human behavior is most appropriate. Some
authors have suggested that cognitive abilities, which are likely correlated
with economic development, are important in explaining behavioral biases
(Casari, Ham, and Kagel, 2007; Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2006). Our
research shows that independent of the personal characteristics of the sub-
jects, the environment where they make their living most strongly correlates
with their economic preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design. Section 3 describes the data and the sample of subjects. Section 4
presents non-parametric estimations on the distribution of preferences. Sec-
giving an evolutionary basis to Allais’ paradox.
3Plott and Zeiler (2007) have pointed out that trading asymmetries cannot necessarily
be attributed to endowment effects and Koszegi and Rabin (2006) argue that behaviorally-
biased subjects expecting to trade will not incur trading asymmetries.
4In List and Haigh (2005)’s paper, experience and the nature of the market, i.e. compet-
itive or not, move in the same direction. So, it is not possible to identify them separately.
In our experiment, they move in opposite directions.
5Our experiment tests violations of expected utility, so we cannot add to the discussion
of experience and the endowment effect.
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tion 5 presents parametric estimates of value functions and decision weights
as a function of personal characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Design and Sample Selection
2.1 Experimental Design
There is a large body of experimental literature that tests alternative models
of decision making under uncertainty (Camerer, 1993; Hey and Orme, 1994;
Harless and Camerer, 1994; Chew and Waller, 1986; Sopher and Gigliotti,
1993). This paper uses the HILO lottery structure first introduced by Chew
and Waller (1986) to generalize Allais (1953)’s original design. The design
requires three potential ordered outcomes xL < xI < xH and two alternative
lotteries: A = (xM , 1) and B = (xL, 1 − α;xH , α), referred to as pair O. To
construct lotteries as in Allais (1953), the design creates compound lotteries
as follows:
Ai = βA+ (1− β)xi and Bi = βB + (1− β)xi for i = L, I,H
In our design, xL = 0, xI = 50c, and xH = 100c. For simplicity of
interpretation, the probability weights we use are α = 0.8 and β = 0.25. The
classic Allais design is obtained by comparing lottery pair I and lottery pair
L. Figure 1 presents all lotteries used in our experiments in the Marshack-
Machina triangle (Machina, 1987). Pairs 1 and 2 reproduce Allais’ design,
pairs 2 and 5 allow to test for either fanning-out or fanning-in (Machina,
1987), and comparisons of pair 1, 3 and 4 provide a direct test of the in-
betweenness hypothesis.
The HILO design is attractive due to its compactness and ability to test
different generalizations of expected utility theory in an efficient way. While
expected utility predicts that a person will choose either Si or Ri, for all lot-
teries i, alternative theories predict different patterns of behavior (see Harless
and Camerer (1994), for details). As noted by Sopher and Gigliotti (1993),
Conlisk (1989) and Camerer (1993), this design might favor alternative the-
ories to expected utility due to the fact that lotteries are located on the
borders of the Marshack-Machina triangle. In that sense, this design might
reject the null hypothesis of expected utility too often. In order to increase
the power of our tests, our design includes an extra pair of lotteries, pair 4.
To elicit risk preferences, subjects were asked to respond to a series of
simple lotteries that includes the lotteries represented in Figure 1 and two
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additional lotteries to measure risk attitudes. The extra two lotteries are a
simplified version of the lotteries first used by Binswanger (1981). Subjects
were asked to choose one of five risky prospects that gave a high and low
payoff with equal probability. The lotteries are listed in Table 2. They were
constructed by either adding 30 × k or subtracting 10 × k, k = 1, ..., 4, to
an initial high and low payoff of (50, 50) or (0, 0). The first set of lotteries
therefore were over gains and the second over gains and losses. The units
of the lottery were cents of the local currency.6 The lottery payments were
set large enough to be salient, but small enough to afford a large number of
observations.
The experimental procedures were as follows. After firm/household sur-
veys were administered, in a separate visit from the visits for the surveys,
the lottery questions were asked. Subjects were asked to make their lottery
decision over gains, then over gains and losses and then over the extra five
lotteries to test for violations of expected utility theory. Once decisions were
made, the lotteries designed to measure risk were resolved by flipping a coin,
and the five rationality lotteries were resolved by choosing a number between
one and twenty out of a bag. Subjects were then paid in cash the sum of their
earnings. Subjects knew of these procedures before making their decisions.
2.2 Sample Selection
The study was conducted with four different populations that represent sec-
tors of the Peruvian economy: employees currently in the private sector (who
were previously in the public sector), entrepreneurs of Gamarra’s garment
district in Lima, vegetable traders in the neighboring Santa Anita’s whole-
sale market in Lima, and farmers of the peasant community of Pomacanchis
in the Andes. The four groups showcase the large disparities in economic
achievement common in most developing countries.
In all four sites, the sampling framework was built from a census of the
firms or households in the area. In Gamarra, Santa Anita and Pomacanchis,
we conducted a census of the entire area and then randomly selected firms
or households from to survey. In Gamarra and Santa Anita, the manager
of the firm was interviewed. In Pomacanchis, the head of the household
was interviewed. In the private sector, we used the census of privatized
6One hundred cents, or 1 sol, could buy a person lunch at the time of the survey.
Participants made seven paid decisions which amounted to around five to seven soles per
person.
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firms done by the Ministry of Labor and developed a sampling framework
stratified by firm size. Employees within the firm were randomly selected to
be interviewed.
Employees in the private sector of the economy were all previously em-
ployed in the public sector. They obtained a professional and/or technical
degree in order to perform their job, i.e. subjects in this sample either en-
tered the job market as professionals or technicians or acquired those skills
through on-the-job training. After economic reforms in the early 1990’s and
a massive reduction in the public sector (Saavedra and Torero, 2004), this
group faced a large increase in the level of competition. Firm ownership
changed to private hands, and the labor market was deregulated. The labor
market in Peru is extremely competitive, and many subjects in this sample
are either unemployed or under-employed and perform jobs different from
those for which they were trained.7 Most researchers think that this sector
represents the formal sector of the economy (i.e., tax-payers with access to
social services). The average length of time a person keeps a job in this sector
decreased by 25% after labor market reforms were implemented (Saavedra
and Torero, 2004; Torero, Deustua, and Hernandez, 2007).
Gamarra is a fast-growing economic cluster of entrepreneurs and is full
of firms involved in small-scale manufacturing and trade. Most of Gamarra’s
entrepreneurs are migrants that started their business outside the formal
financial system. Until the early 1990’s, this sector faced little regulation or
support.8 Gamarra is a 12 square block area in Lima, Peru. It emerged in the
1960’s as an area where migrants started small textile businesses to supply
the growing garment industry. Since its inception, the area has attracted
migrants and entrepreneurs for its agglomeration economies. Now, the area
hosts thousands of small firms engaged in small manufacturing (i.e. retail,
consumption and wholesale goods) and trade. Because of their size, firms
are capable of quickly adapting production to the needs of the market. This
makes the area dynamic and attractive to those willing to take risks. It is also
a highly competitive sector. For example, when we asked the entrepreneurs
how many competitors they face, 48% reported that they had more than 5
competitors in the same location.
7It is important to realize that technical or professional training is a relative term in
Peru. The local education system is of extremely poor quality and potential employees
can access well-developed markets for counterfeit certificates and education degrees.
8In 1995, a new simplified tax system was implemented to make it possible for small
businesses to pay taxes. Further modifications were introduced in 2003.
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Santa Anita’s vegetable wholesale market has been the largest fresh pro-
duce distribution center in Lima until recently. This market was established
around the same time Gamarra started. Most of the traders in this sector
are migrants as well. Contrary to Gamarra, this market is monopolistic with
few traders dominating most of the vegetable market in Lima. Most of the
current traders started as intermediaries, buying fresh produce directly from
producers and then transporting it to the city. They eventually grew enough
to become buyers from smaller intermediaries and now provide fresh produce
to all main markets in Lima. The market is divided into sections, with few
buyers per product.
The peasant community of Pomacanchis was selected because it has a
large rural population and significant economic activity. Pomacanchis Dis-
trict is located in Acomayo Province in Cusco. It is an agricultural (potato)
and livestock area in which several development programs of different NGOs
operate. While poor, the community has easy access to local and regional
markets. Producers in this community depend on the market to sell part of
their production and obtain inputs and household items. The community is
representative of rural life in a developing country. That is, while partially
integrated into some markets, they have limited or no access to credit and
insurance markets and lack access to health care and most public services.
Nonetheless, the community has electricity and access to phone and the in-
ternet. The structure of land, property and production has changed little
since early studies of the area by Cotlear (1989) and Escobal (1994). This
stability is not surprising given that Escobal and Castillo (1992) show that
peasant economies are particularly resilient to large price fluctuations.
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics for the four subsamples. It
shows that the garment district attracts somewhat younger individuals. All
four sites have similar proportions of household/firms headed by men. An
important difference across these populations is the level of education. Pri-
vate sector employees tend to be more educated than people working in the
garment sector, who in turn, are more educated than those in the whole-
sale market. Those in the peasant community are the least educated of all
groups. It is natural to find a correlation between market development and
education. Most competitive sectors tend to require and select more edu-
cated individuals.9 The second to last row of Table 1 provides a measure of
9While there are enormous barriers to entry into the wholesale market, entry and
durability in the wholesale market requires business savvy.
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job or firm rotation in all four populations. On average, employees in the
private sector have held their current jobs for 5.4 years. The life span of firms
in the garment sector is 6.9 years and that of firms in the wholesale market
is 21.7 years. Farmers in the peasant community have been doing this since
an early age, i.e., they have been in this activity for 22.5 years.10
3 Empirical Analysis
This section discusses general patterns in the experimental data. Two sub-
sections discuss parametric and non-parametric estimates of preferences.
3.1 Patterns of Behavior
Table 2 presents the distribution of choices in the seven lotteries presented
to participants. The data is disaggregated by subpopulation to highlight the
patterns of behavior. The top two panels of Table 2 present the results for
lotteries over gains and over gains and losses. The bottom panel presents the
distribution of choices for the lotteries testing the validity of the independence
axiom.
In the top two panels, the lotteries over gains and gains and losses offer
risky prospects that increase simultaneously in expected payoffs and vari-
ances. Given the size of the stakes, one could argue that subjects should
choose according to expected values. Table 2 shows that the average behav-
ior of subjects from all walks of life is not to do this. We do not observe
a clear pattern of risk attitudes across populations. The only exception is
that farmers in the peasant community are the most risk averse subjects in
the sample, with 46% choosing the safest option. Interestingly, there is a
clear tendency to choose higher expected value lotteries over gains and losses
among those working as employees in the private sector. These subjects are
more likely to choose the higher paying lotteries when the lotteries allow
losses compared to when they are defined over gains only. A similar pat-
tern is observed at the other extreme of the development spectrum. Farmers
choose riskier lotteries when losses are allowed. This pattern is not consistent
with loss-aversion.
10People in Pomacanchis have spent their lives farming with only a short break due to
mandatory military service. We calculated the lower bound of the time performing this
activity by assuming that every farmer in our sample started farming at age 25.
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The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the distribution of choices over the
HILO lotteries. Each pair of numbers in each column presents the number of
subjects choosing the safe lottery and the number of subjects choosing the
riskier lottery. The results only present the marginals of the joint distribu-
tion of choices over all lotteries. Since, violations of expected utility might
happen by mistake, one would expect that on average the proportion of sub-
jects choosing safe and riskier alternatives remains similar across lotteries.
Lotteries 1 and 2 are consistent with Allais’ presentation. The switch from
safe choices in Lottery 1 to risky choices in Lottery 2 is referred to as Allais’
paradox. Table 2 shows that the Allais paradox is not equally prevalent in all
populations.11 Employees in the private sector and managers in the garment
industry are the least likely to suffer from it, whereas wholesale traders and
farmers are the most likely.
Figure 1 shows that lotteries 1, 3 and 4 are all located along the same
line. Any theory of decision under risk satisfying the in-betweenness axiom
would predict that subjects will choose similarly across these three lotteries.
This does not occur in any of the populations under study. Violations of
in-betweenness seem to be most severe among wholesale traders. Finally,
comparison of lotteries 2 and 5 allows us to test for the fanning-out hypoth-
esis (Machina, 1987). The evidence in favor of this hypothesis is weak and
consistent with previous research (see Chew and Waller (1986); Harless and
Camerer (1994); Conlisk (1989)).
In summary, this section shows that the distribution of risk preferences
is not uniformly distributed across populations and that more competitive
areas tend to be populated by agents closer to the expected utility paradigm.
3.2 Identifying Preferences - Nonparametric Estimates
We look first at nonparametric estimates and turn to parametric estimates in
the next section. The estimates allow a look at the distribution of preferences
and for the possibility that subjects make judgement or decision errors.
11The same results hold if we control for the decisions that the subject made in the
gain-gain and gain-loss lotteries.
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3.2.1 Distribution of Behavior
Several authors have discussed alternative ways to unearth underlying risk
preferences when decisions are made with error.12 We follow Harless and
Camerer (1994). The basic intuition behind these approaches is that, given
a subject’s preferences, different error structures will produce different pat-
terns of observed behavior. For instance, in our experimental design, ex-
pected utility theory allows only two patterns of behavior: RRRRR and
SSSSS. If a person makes one mistake only, possible patterns of behavior will
be: SRRRR, RSRRR, RRSRR, RRRSR, RRRRS, RSSSS, SRSSS, SSRSS,
SSSRS, SSSSR. If this subject makes a mistake with probability ² and the
proportion of people that have preferences supporting pattern RRRRR is
pRRRRR, then the probability of observing pattern of behavior SRRRR is
pRRRRR× ²× (1− ²)4+(1−pRRRRR)× ²4× (1− ²). A well-specified likelihood
function can be constructed for any theory of behavior under risk follow-
ing analogous reasoning. Different theories that allow different patterns of
behavior are potentially discernible with enough data.
We present estimates for five theories of behavior under risk for our four
different populations in Tables 3a,b,c,d and e. The five models are: expected
utility theory (EU), rank dependent expected utility theory with concave
probability weights (RD-cave), rank dependent expected utility theory with
convex probability weights (RD-vex), the mixed fanning hypothesis (MF),
and prospect theory (PT). All the estimates are based only on the four orig-
inal HILO lotteries, i.e., lotteries 1, 2, 3 and 5. The estimates are similar
if lottery 4 is also included.13 Our analysis concentrates on the above men-
tioned theories only because they allow a number of patterns observed in the
data and they contain most of the patterns of behavior predicted by other
theories.
Table 3 presents choices in the following order: Lottery 3, Lottery 1,
Lottery 2, and Lottery 5.14 Lottery 3 is the original lottery upon which
Chew and Waller (1986) construct all others lotteries. This is lottery O in
Chew and Waller (1986)’s terminology. The first, second, and fifth lotteries
12Hey and Orme (1994) uses a random utility model to estimate preferences of ex-
perimental subjects. Harless and Camerer (1994) propose an error model to estimate
alternatives models with aggregate data. Loomes, Moffatt, and Sugden (2002) discusses
several alternative ways to model decisions made with error.
13These are available from the authors upon request.
14The lotteries are presented in this order to make them comparable to the presentation
in Harless and Camerer (1994)
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are obtained by mixing Lottery 3 with the middle, low and high outcome
(lotteries I, L, and H), as shown in the experimental design section.
Table 3a shows the patterns of behavior and estimates for all the subjects
in our experiments. These patterns are difficult to reconcile with maximiza-
tion of expected value. For instance, of all the patterns that allow exactly
one deviation from RRRR, pattern RRSR appears 110 times out of 358.
This is slightly less than a third of the time or roughly twice as frequent as
would be predicted if one deviation from RRRR was random over the four
possible one-deviation patterns. Of all the choices, 26 percent are consistent
with Allais’ paradox. Table 3a also presents a test of the hypothesis that
expected utility is a valid restriction of more general models of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. For instance, the last row of the fourth column tests
the null hypothesis that the probability that all extra patterns of behavior
allowed by RD-vex is zero. The test has 7 degrees of freedom (9 patterns
of behavior allowed by RD-vex minus 2 allowed by EU). It shows that the
hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, the hypothesis is rejected for all the
other alternative theories at any standard level of significance.
Similar estimates for each one of the four subpopulations in our study are
presented in Tables 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e. Notice that patterns identified in the
aggregate data are reproduced in all the subsamples. The explanatory power
of rank dependent expected utility with a convex weighting function is poor
in every one of these populations. The other three theories perform better
than expected utility and RD-vex in all four subsamples. The likelihood ratio
test does not allow us to determine what theory is best overall. Each theory
seems to miss some important observed pattern of behavior.
The nonparametric approach permits us to obtain conservative estimates
of the prevalence of expected utility agents in the data. This is so because
the estimates account for potential errors in judgement, as well as alternative
patterns of behavior. Ignoring RD-vex, that has a poor fit for the data, we
can calculate the probability that an agent choose either SSSS or RRRR for
each population and each model. A clear pattern emerges: the presence of
behavior consistent with expected utility is different across populations.
Among farmers, the proportion consistent with expected utility is between
45-60 percent. Among wholesale market traders the proportion is between
50-52 percent. Among managers in the garment industry, the proportion
consistent with expected utility theory is between 65-78 percent. Finally,
among the employees in the private sector, the percent fluctuates between
70-90. The comparison between wholesale traders and garment industry
11
managers is particularly interesting because these two populations neighbor
each other geographically and share many socio-economic characteristics and
background.
3.2.2 Rationality and Demographics
We are also interested in knowing if expected utility maximizers in the pop-
ulation are related to covariates. To do so, we look at the prevalence of this
group by risk aversion, age and education–Tables 1 and 2 make clear that the
populations in the study differ across these three variables. Estimates of the
Harless and Camerer (1994) model for different cuts of the data are shown
in Table 4. For instance, the first panel compares the distribution of prefer-
ences of those without and with high school education. The estimates show
that higher levels of education are correlated with the presence of expected
utility maximizers. For instance, using estimates of prospect theory, we find
that those with at least high school education are 20 percentage points more
likely to behave according to expected utility. Mixed fanning estimates give
an estimate half this size. While there are differences across education levels,
the estimates show that neither age nor sex explain much of the variation in
the distribution of preferences.
Looking now at risk preferences, the last panel shows the behavior of those
choosing less risky choices (one of the first two lotteries) with those choosing
more risky choices (one of the last two lotteries) over the gain lottery.15 Here
we find large differences in the distribution of preferences between these two
groups. Those who chose more risky lotteries are between 15-20 percent-
age points more likely to conform with EU while those choosing less risky
choices deviate strongly. This suggests that risk aversion over small stakes
is positively correlated with the presence of behavioral biases. However, it
could also signal that the experiments are calibrated for relatively high levels
of risk aversion.16 This would imply that our estimates underestimate the
presence of behavioral biases among relatively less risk averse subjects.
In order to test whether differences in risk attitudes and education explain
the differences in behavior across sites, we estimate the model by location
and personal characteristics. Table 5 presents data across populations for
15We use the gain lottery because it exhibits the most variation.
16If our lotteries were re-calibrated such that the risky and safe lotteries were along a
line parallel to the 45-degree line, we might find more deviations among those choosing
riskier options.
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those that chose less risky lotteries over gains and those that choose riskier
lotteries. Table 6 presents estimates across populations for those with less
than high school education and those with at least high school education.
Two patterns emerge in the data. First, differences across populations
are smaller for those that behave more risk aversely and for those with less
than high school education. Table 5 and Table 6 show that some important
differences remain in the case of education. The strongest differences are
between public sector employees with less than high school education and
those with at least high school education. Also large differences across popu-
lations remain if we restrict ourselves to the sample of educated and less risk
averse.17 That is, the existing differences across these populations cannot
be attributed only to differences in observable characteristics. The differ-
ences across populations are particularly large among those with at least
high school education. These results are therefore consistent with either
sorting or with learning through market experience.
The fact that there are fewer expected utility maximizers among whole-
sale market traders is particularly interesting. As mentioned before, this
population shares the background of the managers in the garment district.
Indeed, these two populations share contiguous geographical spaces. How-
ever, one population is more consistent with expected utility maximization
than the other. We cannot argue that wholesale traders do not have market
experience since their activity is indeed to trade. So, we cannot attribute
economic rationality to experience with trading per se. A large difference
between these two sectors is that one is extremely concentrated and the
other is extremely competitive. Economic rationality therefore seems to be
correlated with experiencing competitive pressures rather than trading itself.
The fact that those working in a competitive labor market tend to be more
consistent with expected utility theory supports this hypothesis.18
17These results are not shown in the paper but are available from the authors upon
request.
18To test whether experience or competition increases rational behavior, we compared
the behavior of less and more experienced managers in the garment industry. Since the
survival rate of new firms in this sector is small, one would expect that new firms will
experience relatively more market competition (unless they are a spin-off of larger firms).
Consistent with the importance of competition, we find that inexperienced managers tend
to be between 5-20 percent more likely to satisfy expected utility depending on the model
adopted.
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3.3 Identifying Preferences - Parametric Estimates
The previous section suggests that socio-economic background could explain
differences across experimental sites. In this section, we adapt Harless and
Camerer (1994)’s model to allow the probability of behaving according to
expected utility to depend parametrically on covariates. This allows us to
control for a variety of covariates at a time and obtain estimates that allow
for statistical testing.
Let M1 be an alternative model to expected utility (EU) and let x be an
observed pattern of behavior. The law of total probability establishes that:
Pr(x) = Pr(x|EU)× Pr(EU) + Pr(x|M1)× (1− Pr(EU))
where Pr(x|T ) is the conditional probability of observing pattern x given
theory T , and Pr(EU) = F (zβ). F is a cumulative function that maps
index zβ to the interval [0,1]. z represents a list of covariates. In this paper,
we assume that F follows a logistic form.19 This statistical model allows
the estimation of the probability of conforming to expected utility theory
without imposing parametric restrictions on the form the utility function or
weighting function must take.
The estimates for each of the four alternative models discussed so far are
presented in Table 7. The top panel presents the estimates corresponding to
the proposed behavioral model, and the middle panel presents the estimates
for expected utility theory as compared to that alternative behavioral model.
The bottom panel present the logistic share equation described above. The
share equation controls for sex, age, and education. Three dummies are
added to test if any remaining difference between places exists after control-
ling for socio-economic background. The omitted category is the wholesale
vegetable market.
Since, as in previous estimations, the RD-vex model does a poor job in
describing the data, all the discussion concentrates on the three remaining
models. The first result is that no socio-demographic variables seem to be
good predictors of behavior in the experiments. This suggests that the dif-
ferences in behavior observed in the nonparametric estimations reflect the
19We also used a latent class model to make comparisons across experimental sites. A
problem with latent class models is that they depend on untestable parametric assumptions
of the utility function and the probability weighting function. Estimates using Prelec
(1998)’s weighting function produced similar results.
14
difference in socio-demographic variables across experimental sites, not the
effect of these variables on behavior. Our sample has enough within and
between variation to identify these differential effects.
The parametric estimates show that the differences in behavior between
private sector employees and entrepreneurs versus that of whole traders and
peasants is not due to differences in socio-economic background. All three
models show that private sector employees are more likely to conform to ex-
pected utility and two models (RD-cave and PT) predict the same for the
garment industry entrepreneurs. The estimates also show that the proba-
bility of satisfying expected utility theory is between 58% and 59% in the
garment industry district and between 85% and 86% among private sector
employees. This number is only between 39% and 40% in the wholesale
market.20
The strong showing of expected utility maximizers in the private sector
is particularly illuminating. This sector started out mainly based on rent
extraction (when it was the public sector). Now, it is based on competition.
These results suggest that the experience of market competition is important
to the survival of behavioral biases.
4 Conclusions
We investigate the relationship between market structure and the presence
of behavioral biases in decision making under risk. From a random sample
of individuals working in unequally developed markets, we collect data on
a series of experiments designed to detect the nature of expected utility
violations. The markets visited differ not only in their depth but also in
their level of competition.
We find that market experience alone is not enough to eliminate violations
of expected utility theory. Evidence of violations persist among participants
in all the visited markets and especially among those with a lot of trading
experience. We find that behavioral biases are weaker in markets that are
more competitive. For instance, we find that wholesale traders that trade on
a daily basis but do so in a concentrated, noncompetitive market are among
the ones most likely to violate expected utility theory. Entrepreneurs, in an
adjacent market who trade daily but do so in a highly competitive market,
20These estimates assume that all parameters that are not significant are zero except
the constant.
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are more likely to satisfy expected utility. While violations of expected utility
theory are correlated with education and attitudes toward risk, we find that
when controlling for both neither one can completely explain the differences
found across populations.
Our results show that preferences are not distributed equally across mar-
kets and that experience with trade does not necessarily foster rationality.
Consistent with the intuition that evolutionary pressure is important in the
selection of preferences, we find that competitive markets either attract or
create individuals closer to the neoclassical economic paradigm. Our results
suggests that economic policy itself can have consequences on the decisions
that people make. This would suggest that policy evaluation cannot assume
preferences as given.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Private Garment Wholesale Peasant
Sector Industry Traders Community
Age 50.84 (0.362) 42.89 (0.678) 51.77 (0.851) 47.53 (0.759)
Male 0.85 (0.014) 0.87 (0.020) 0.85 (0.024) 0.83 (0.020)
Primary Ed. 0.12 (0.012) 0.14 (0.020) 0.31 (0.031) 0.19 (0.020)
Secondary Ed. 0.39 (0.019) 0.54 (0.029) 0.43 (0.033) 0.08 (0.014)
College Ed. 0.47 (0.019) 0.30 (0.027) 0.19 (0.026) 0.03 (0.009)
Emp. Duration (Years) 5.39 (0.165) 6.89 (0.390) 21.69 (0.785) 22.53 (0.759)
Observations 669 300 228 384
Note: standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2. Experimental Results
Private Garment Wholesale Peasant
Sector Industry Traders Community
Lottery Gains & Gains Lotteries (Percent)
(50, 50) 143 (21) 54 (18) 57 (25) 177 (46)
(80, 40) 122 (18) 66 (22) 23 (10) 55 (14)
(110, 30) 91 (14) 62 (21) 29 (13) 42 (11)
(140, 20) 77 (12) 57 (19) 40 (18) 29 (8)
(170, 10) 236 (35) 61 (20) 79 (35) 81 (21)
Lottery Gains & Losses Lotteries (Percent)
(0, 0) 91 (14) 94 (31) 107 (47) 73 (19)
(30, -10) 53 (8) 80 (27) 39 (17) 90 (23)
(60, -20) 103 (15) 58 (19) 25 (11) 83 (22)
(90, -30) 105 (16) 52 (17) 39 (17) 89 (23)
(120, -40) 317 (47) 16 (5) 18 (8) 49 (13)
Lottery HILO Lotteries (Safe, Risky) - Numbers
1 (159, 510) (107, 193) (115, 113) (172, 212)
2 (147, 522) (80, 220) (39, 189) (83, 301)
3 (112, 557) (82, 218) (70, 158) (147, 237)
4 (157, 512) (91, 209) (40, 188) (128, 256)
5 (120, 549) (78, 222) (38, 190) (90, 294)
Note: In the top two panels, the last four columns list
the number (and the percent) who chose each lottery.
In the bottom panel, each pair lists (the number choosing the
safe lottery, the number choosing the riskier lottery)
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Table 3a. Whole Sample
Patterna Frequency Expected Rank Dependent Mixed Prospect
Utility Convex Concave Fanning Theory
SSSS 41 0.08 0.08 0.043 0.044 0.050
SSSR 33 0.004 0.003 0.005
SSRS 43 0.016 0.016 0.012
SSRR 132 0.111 0.110 0.108
SRSS 15 0
SRSR 31 2.3E-33 0.008
SRRS 25 0 0.003 2.5E-33
SRRR 91 0 0 7.8E-34
RSSS 20 0.0122
RSSR 49 0.012 0.016
RSRS 43 4.9E-05 0.011 0.003
RSRR 192 0.085 0.094 0.096
RRSS 50 0
RRSR 110 2.9E-33 0.044
RRRS 89 3.5E-33 0.016 0
RRRR 617 0.919 0.919 0.718 0.635 0.725
Error Rate 0.217 0.217 0.157 0.135 0.163
mean Log-Likelihood -2.248 -2.248 -2.186 -2.184 -2.188
Likelihood test 0.00(1.00) 194.78(0.000) 201.66(0.000) 188.69(0.000)
N 1581
a Pattern is based on choices in Lotteries 3, 1, 2, 5.
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Table 3b. Private Sector Employees
Patterna Frequency Expected Rank Dependent Mixed Prospect
Utility Convex Concave Fanning Theory
SSSS 17 0.0609 0.059 0.041 0.035 0.041
SSSR 10 0.008 0.010 0.014
SSRS 10 0.011 0.011 0.010
SSRR 26 0.034 0.040 0.030
SRSS 5 2.5E-33
SRSR 11 0 0.009
SRRS 10 3.1E-34 0.011 1.5E-33
SRRR 23 6.8E-33 1.6E-32 2.28E-33
RSSS 3 2.1E-33
RSSR 19 0.022 0.01
RSRS 12 0.001 0.008 0
RSRR 62 0.024 0.063 0.041
RRSS 20 0.011
RRSR 62 0.032 0.086
RRRS 43 3.0E-33 0.040 0.004
RRRR 336 0.939 0.897 0.858 0.669 0.859
Error Rate 0.163 0.154 0.136 0.084 0.139
mean Log-Likelihood -1.941 -1.938 -1.922 -1.907 -1.925
Likelihood test 3.74(0.81) 25.38(0.001) 45.71(0.000) 21.54(0.006)
N 669
a Pattern is based on choices in Lotteries 3, 1, 2, 5.
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Table 3c. Entrepreneurs - Garment Industry
Patterna Frequency Expected Rank Dependent Mixed Prospect
Utility Convex Concave Fanning Theory
SSSS 11 0.109 0.103 0.062 0.069 0.080
SSSR 4 0 0 0
SSRS 10 0.017 0.020 0.010
SSRR 27 0.117 0.117 0.114
SRSS 5 8.9E-33
SRSR 4 1.7E-32 1.1E-32
SRRS 4 0 5.5E-33 0
SRRR 17 4.0E-34 1.5E-32 0
RSSS 5 0.033
RSSR 11 0.015 0.017
RSRS 7 6.3E-33 0 1.6E-33
RSRR 32 0.045 0.075 0.071
RRSS 18 0.040
RRSR 22 0 0.078
RRRS 18 0 0.046 0.031
RRRR 105 0.891 0.857 0.712 0.578 0.695
Error Rate 0.234 0.223 0.176 0.149 0.181
mean Log-Likelihood -2.356 -2.353 -2.311 -2.305 -2.314
Likelihood test 1.92(0.96) 27.20(0.000) 30.79(0.001) 24.90(0.002)
N 300
a Pattern is based on choices in Lotteries 3, 1, 2, 5.
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Table 3d. Vegetable Whole Traders
Patterna Frequency Expected Rank Dependent Mixed Prospect
Utility Convex Concave Fanning Theory
SSSS 5 0.089 0.086 0.036 0.041 0.050
SSSR 6 0.013 0.008 0.014
SSRS 7 0.025 0.016 0.010
SSRR 33 0.181 0.179 0.181
SRSS 3 3.0E-33
SRSR 3 7.8E-34 0.013
SRRS 4 0 0.020 0.017
SRRR 9 0.036 0 5.7E-33
RSSS 5 0.027
RSSR 9 0.019 0.038
RSRS 6 4.9E-33 0.015 0.007
RSRR 44 0.220 0.210 0.248
RRSS 3 0
RRSR 5 1.9E-32 4.4E-34
RRRS 5 0 1.15E-34 0
RRRR 81 0.91 0.878 0.478 0.460 0.474
Error Rate 0.248 0.244 0.103 0.090 0.113
mean Log-Likelihood -2.373 -2.372 -2.124 -2.123 -2.133
Likelihood test 0.31(1.00) 113.80(0.000) 113.95(0.001) 109.50(0.002)
N 228
a Pattern is based on choices in Lotteries 3, 1, 2, 5.
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Table 3e. Peasants
Patterna Frequency Expected Rank Dependent Mixed Prospect
Utility Convex Concave Fanning Theory
SSSS 8 0.065 0.0578 0.023 0.026 0.027
SSSR 13 0 0.0134 0.008
SSRS 16 3.3E-04 0.020 0.006
SSRR 46 0.256 0.174 0.203
SRSS 2 0
SRSR 13 0 0.016
SRRS 7 4.8E-32 0 0
SRRR 42 0.181 0.083 0.068
RSSS 7 0.010
RSSR 10 6.9E-33 0
RSRS 18 0.030 0.044 0.045
RSRR 54 0.102 0.145 0.126
RRSS 9 7.8E-33
RRSR 21 5.3E-33 0.027
RRRS 23 1.5E-32 0.025 2.2E-34
RRRR 95 0.935 0.762 0.581 0.426 0.517
Error Rate 0.294 0.275 0.207 0.157 0.191
mean Log-Likelihood -2.501 -2.489 -2.397 -2.394 -2.395
Likelihood test 9.03(0.25) 79.73(0.000) 82.44(0.001) 81.63(0.002)
N 384
a Pattern is based on choices in Lotteries 3, 1, 2, 5.
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Table 7. Parametric Estimates
Behavioral Model
RD-vex RD-cave MF PT
SSSS 0.278 (1.345) 0.011 (0.045) 0.037 (0.029) 0.046 (0.047)
SSSR 0.019 (0.035) 0.017 (0.037)
SSRS 0.056 (0.037) 0.039 (0.032) 0.040 (0.038)
SSRR 0.463∗∗∗ (0.085) 0.340∗ (0.181) 0.470∗∗∗ (0.082)
SRSS 0 (0)
SRSR 0 (0) 0.031 (0.025)
SRRS 0 (0) 0.003 (0.019) 0 (0)
SRRR 0.472 (1.771) 0.007 (0.042) 0 (0)
RSSS 0.060∗∗ (0.029) 0 (0) 0 (0)
RSSR 0.018 (0.041) 0.041 (0.034)
RSRS 0.006 (0.038) 0.034 (0.032) 0.037 (0.040)
RSRR 0.365∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.269∗ (0.143) 0.389∗∗∗ (0.075)
RRSS 0 (0)
RRSR 0 (0) 0.049 (0.051)
RRRS 0 (0) 0.028 (0.040) 7.3E-06 (0.051)
RRRR 0.250 (3.075) 4.6E-06 (0.094) 0.121 (0.426) 7.1E-06 (0.092)
Expected Utility
SSSS 0.057 (0.099) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.050∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.015)
RRRR 0.943∗∗∗ (0.099) 0.948∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.950∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.948∗∗∗ (0.015)
Error Rate 0.210∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.007)
Share Equation
Constant -0.023 (0.530) -0.428 (3.823) -0.372 (3.194) -0.444 (2.471)
Male 0.102 (1.675) 0.229 (0.329) 0.285∗ (0.158) 0.240 (0.277)
Age -0.038 (1.627) 0.337 (1.919) -0.012 (0.065) 0.312 (2.427)
At Least Primary 0.322 (9.625) -0.095 (1.456) -0.323 (2.883) -0.065 (0.316)
At Least Secondary 0.495 (3.031) 0.042 (0.064) 0.055 (0.066) 0.045 (0.064)
Garment District -0.390 (5.569) 0.805∗∗∗ (0.316) 0.705 (0.531) 0.847∗∗∗ (0.334)
Peasant Community -0.447 (3.095) 0.176 (0.303) 9.4E-04 (0.265) 0.187 (0.325)
Private Sector 0.863 (8.597) 2.237∗∗∗ (0.376) 2.123∗∗∗ (0.748) 2.268∗∗∗ (0.409)
mean-Likelihood -2.239 -2.154 -2.153 -2.156
Observations 1581 1581 1581 1581
Standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
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